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The Politics of Corporate Alien
Tort Cases
Chimène I. Keitner∗
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides U.S. federal courts with subject
matter jurisdiction over violations of certain universally recognized
international legal norms.1 In recent years, courts have confronted cases
brought under the ATS against accomplices to international law violations
(as opposed to direct perpetrators), and against corporations (as opposed to
individuals). The paradigmatic corporate alien tort case seeks money
damages for injuries caused by a multinational corporation’s provision of
assistance that had a substantial effect on the perpetration of an international
law violation, with knowledge that the assistance would have such an effect.
The recipient of that assistance (generally a foreign government or
paramilitary organization) is often immune from suit or otherwise beyond
the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
However, under certain
circumstances, the provision of assistance itself violates international law
and may therefore give rise to subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.
Since juridical entities, including both states and corporations, are not
themselves literally capable of acting, courts must determine what rules to
use to attribute the conduct of individual human beings to these juridical
entities. When an individual acts, legal responsibility might be borne solely
by the juridical entity, both by the juridical entity and the individual, or
solely by the individual. For example, various forms of corporate
organization may serve to shield individuals from legal responsibility for
certain debts acquired or actions performed in the name of the corporate
entity. At the same time, just as corporations do not always shield
individuals from legal responsibility, individual officials have increasingly
been recognized as sharing concurrent legal responsibility with states for
certain internationally unlawful conduct. On a literal level, rules regulating
conduct always govern the behavior of individuals because only individuals
can actually act. Rules of attribution determine the allocation of legal
responsibility for an individual’s conduct, and other rules (such as those
governing jurisdiction and immunities) determine whether a particular
∗
1.

Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).
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domestic or international tribunal can adjudicate the lawfulness of that
conduct and impose legal consequences on the individual, the juridical
entity, or both. U.S. courts confronting ATS cases must often identify and
apply these various kinds of rules.
Some large corporations rival states for their capacity to affect the lives
of individuals around the world. Those concerned with protecting and
promoting individual well-being have thus naturally focused on the behavior
of individuals acting on behalf of corporations, in addition to the behavior of
individuals acting on behalf of states. This focus has spread to the realm of
ATS litigation. At least two key features distinguish corporate ATS cases
from those brought against individual perpetrators of international law
violations who enter U.S. territory. First, in terms of shaping behavior, the
goal of these corporate cases is not to deter individual human rights violators
from entering or remaining in U.S. territory; rather, their behavioral goal is
to deter individuals acting on behalf of corporations from engaging in certain
forms of harmful conduct in countries whose own judicial systems are often
ill-equipped to regulate such conduct. Second, because multinational
corporations generally have assets that are within the reach of U.S.
enforcement jurisdiction, corporate ATS cases have been defended much
more vigorously than many of the earlier cases brought against individual
defendants.
They have thus generated greater controversy among
constituencies concerned about impunity for harmful conduct, on the one
hand, and the distortionary effects of excessive liability on the other.
Judges adjudicating corporate ATS cases are certainly aware of these
debates. In theory, their role is to apply governing doctrine to the allegations
at hand, leaving it to the legislature to modify that doctrinal framework if
necessary in light of its policy consequences. In practice, as in many areas
of the law, this division of labor is more easily articulated than achieved. In
part because of the terse nature of the ATS itself, certain judicial
interpretations may appear to be driven largely by exogenous policy
considerations.
In 2010, the Second Circuit decided two issues of importance to the
future of corporate ATS cases: the standard for aiding and abetting liability,
and the availability of ATS jurisdiction over corporate defendants, as
opposed to natural persons. The questions of accessorial liability and
corporate liability are often, although not necessarily, intertwined.2 In the
Second Circuit, the same three-judge panel (consisting of Chief Judge
Jacobs, Judge Cabranes, and Judge Leval) answered both questions. In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the members of the
panel agreed that, under international law, corporations are only liable for
aiding and abetting an international law violation if they provide substantial
assistance to the principal tortfeasor with the purpose of facilitating the
2. See Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
61, 63 (2008).
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underlying offense.3 The plaintiffs in that case alleged that Talisman
knowingly aided and abetted an armed campaign of ethnic cleansing against
the non-Muslim Sudanese living in the area of Talisman’s oil concession in
southern Sudan. The Second Circuit dismissed their claims, and the U.S.
Supreme Court denied review.
Although there remains some room for interpretation in establishing a
defendant’s “purpose” going forward, the Talisman decision is widely
perceived as narrowing the category of accomplices who can be held liable
under the ATS. This is particularly true given the obstacles to evidencegathering in many of the situations out of which ATS cases arise, which may
further complicate efforts to establish a defendant’s purpose.4 The Talisman
standard arguably presents a higher threshold for claims against individuals
and corporations for aiding and abetting international law violations than
existed under previous case law.5
Talisman was argued on the same day and before the same panel as
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, a case involving support allegedly
provided by a Nigerian subsidiary of Shell to the Nigerian government’s
violent suppression of protests against oil exploration and development
activities in the Ogoni region of the Niger Delta.6 The question of whether
corporations are appropriate defendants in ATS cases—that is, whether the
conduct of individual directors, officers, and employees can appropriately be
attributed to a corporation for the purpose of imposing legal consequences
on the corporation under the ATS—was not briefed in Kiobel. However,
Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Cabranes focused on this question in their
majority opinion. They held that the absence of corporate criminal liability
under customary international law means that ATS suits against corporations
(as opposed to their individual officers, directors, and employees) cannot
3. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 263 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010). Agreement on this question had eluded a different three-judge
panel of the Second Circuit in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
4. I have argued elsewhere that international law supports a knowledge standard. See Keitner,
supra note 2, at 90 (indicating that “[t]he most legally sound [judicial] opinion on the question of
accomplice liability has yet to be written: one that identifies international law as the appropriate
source for defining accomplice liability under the ATS, and that correctly defines aiding and abetting
as providing assistance that had a substantial effect on the commission of the underlying violation,
with knowledge that these acts [would] assist or facilitate the commission of the violation”).
5. Earlier cases establishing the accomplice liability of individuals include Cabello v.
Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2005), Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112,
1148–49 (E.D. Cal. 2004), and Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
6. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). For summary and
analysis, see Chimène I. Keitner, Introductory Note to U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals: Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 49 I.L.M. 1510 (2010); Chimène I. Keitner, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum: Another Round in the Fight Over Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, ASIL
INSIGHT, Sept. 30 2010, http://www.asil.org/insights100930.cfm.
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proceed.7 Judge Leval, concurring in the result, would have dismissed the
claims in Kiobel under the standard for aiding and abetting liability
established in Talisman, while preserving the possibility of ATS cases
against corporations for conduct that meets the Talisman standard.
The majority found the absence of international criminal tribunals with
jurisdiction over corporations significant in determining the scope of civil
jurisdiction under the ATS. This is because the ATS gives U.S. federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction over violations of international law. The
majority reasoned that U.S. courts can only have jurisdiction over
corporations under the ATS if corporations themselves are universally
recognized as being capable of violating customary international law. For
Judge Leval, by contrast, the absence of an established practice among
international tribunals of holding corporations liable for international law
violations does not preclude U.S. courts from doing so as a matter of
domestic law.
My own approach would be to ask whether the attribution of individual
conduct to a corporate entity for the purpose of ascribing legal liability is a
“conduct-regulating rule.”8 If it is, then the question is properly governed by
international law. If it is not (which is my inclination), then domestic law
properly supplies the answer. Under this approach, international law
supplies the elements of the violation, including both the elements of the
underlying offense (such as genocide) and the elements of accessorial
liability (such as aiding and abetting). Domestic law supplies other
elements, such as the rules for attributing conduct of the corporation’s (and
its foreign subsidiaries’) directors, officers, and employees to the corporation
for the purpose of legal liability.
The question then arises: Whose domestic law? With respect to most
matters, the answer will be the law of the forum state. The ATS represents
an exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction, not prescriptive jurisdiction
(because the conduct-regulating rules are supplied by international law).
Seen in this light, it seems that the most interesting questions raised by
corporate ATS cases have yet to be explored, including how the concept of
corporate personhood operates when litigation involves the intersection of
international laws governing individual conduct and domestic laws
governing the attribution of that conduct to juridical entities.
In Kiobel, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought a rehearing by the panel
on the question of corporate liability. Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge
Cabranes each wrote a separate concurring opinion denying the motion for
rehearing, and Judge Leval responded in dissent. While Chief Judge Jacobs

7. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145.
8. See Keitner, supra note 2, at 72 (arguing that “the most coherent approach would look to
U.S. law on the question of personal jurisdiction, including the type of entity against which a claim
can be asserted” while “international law would supply the substantive, conduct-regulating rules that
apply to private actors”).
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commended the “scholarly force” of Judge Leval’s original opinion, he also
emphasized the need to “subject Judge Leval’s conclusion to some tests of
reality.”9 In particular, he expressed concern that, if Talisman were the only
obstacle to corporate ATS cases, attempts by plaintiffs to “plead around”
Talisman could “delay dismissal of ATS suits against corporations,” and that
“the invasive discovery that ensues could coerce settlements that have no
relation to the prospect of success on the ultimate merits.”10 This brutally
honest account of Chief Judge Jacobs’s policy concerns prompted responses
from both of his colleagues. Judge Leval seized the opportunity to criticize
the majority for “arrogat[ing] to itself a power [to make foreign and
domestic policy] that might appropriately be exercised by the Congress or by
the Executive Branch, but does not properly belong to the courts.”11 Judge
Cabranes, intent on reclaiming the mantle of judicial agnosticism with
regard to matters of policy, insisted that the Kiobel majority’s distinction
between juridical persons and natural persons was dictated by “fidelity to the
law, not a ‘policy agenda.’”12 Judge Cabranes’s disclaimer seems premised
on the notion that law and policy are distinct categories, and that the
legitimacy of judicial opinions depends on remaining firmly within the
closed domain of “the law.” Although doctrinal arguments are generally
substantively distinguishable from policy arguments, law and policy (and,
hence, politics, which involves contestation among policy choices) are
deeply intertwined. In acknowledging this, Chief Judge Jacobs helped to
move the judicial discussion more explicitly towards weighing the social
costs and benefits of corporate ATS cases. It remains unclear, however,
whether federal judges are either empowered or equipped to do this
weighing.
Ultimately, the political branches bear responsibility for weighing
competing considerations and developing a regulatory framework (or lack
thereof) that takes into account multiple intersecting policy goals. In the
meantime, federal judges will continue to grapple with the implications of
corporate ATS cases in their courtrooms. In so doing, they should be wary
of modifying doctrine in response to policy considerations in corporate ATS
cases that could have unintended negative consequences for ATS cases
against individuals, or for other cases involving the interpretation and
application of international law.

9. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-CV, 06-4876-CV, 2011 WL338048, at
*1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011) (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
10. Id. at *3.
11. Id. at *4 (Leval, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at *9 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
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The impulse to use litigation as a tool for effectuating social change is
engrained in U.S. legal culture. That said, advocates concerned with
modifying future corporate behavior might achieve better overall outcomes
by focusing on strategies beyond ATS litigation. Advocates concerned with
seeking reparations for past misconduct might increasingly seek to do so,
when possible, in the courts of the state where the misconduct occurred,
rather than in U.S. courts. To the extent that other countries’ courts become
more involved in adjudicating alleged corporate complicity in international
law violations, the emphasis in U.S. courtrooms might shift from questions
of jurisdiction and justiciability to questions of recognition and enforcement.
It will be interesting to see whether U.S. judges who have emphasized the
importance of foreign remedies for foreign harms are more willing to
enforce judgments rendered abroad against U.S. corporations than they have
been to issue such judgments themselves.
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